A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTUAL IMPREVISION by Gânfălean, Ioan & Gheberta, Ioana Nicoleta
AGORA International Journal of Juridical Sciences, www.juridicaljournal.univagora.ro 
ISSN 1843-570X, E-ISSN 2067-7677 
No. 3 (2014), pp. 63 - 70 
 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF CONTRACTUAL 
IMPREVISION 
I. Gânfălean, I. N. Gheberta 
 
 
Ioan Gânfălean  
Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, Law Department 
"1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, Romania 
*Correspondence: Ioan Gânfălean, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, 11-13, Nicolae Iorga 
St., Alba Iulia, Romania 
E-mail: ioan.ganfalean@yahoo.com 
 
Ioana Nicoleta Gheberta 
Faculty of Law and Administrative Sciences, the Law Department 
West University, Timisoara, Romania 
*Correspondence: Ioana Nicoleta Gheberta, Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, 11-13, 




 This study is aimed to review the provisions of article 1271 of the New Civil Code and, 
in particular, the effects of contractual imprevision. We have attempted to outline the 
possibilities that this relatively new institution which has appeared in the Romanian legal 
landscape makes available to the parties in view of restoring the contract equilibrium further 
to the occurrence of exceptional circumstances, namely the limits set for the subsidiary 
intervention of the court when negotiations fail.     
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 1. Introduction 
 The theory of contractual imprevision is a concept which arose vivid controversies, on 
account of the effects it produces. Initially, it was rejected under the Old Civil Code, taking 
into account the nominalistic principle, set in article 1578 in the matter of money lending 
agreements1; at a later time, it was proposed that this provision be interpreted as optional2, 
while some authors even wondered whether it had already become obsolete3. 
 All these disputes were ended by the New Civil Code, in article 12714, which regulates 
the conditions and effects of contractual imprevision. In this text, the Romanian lawmaker 
aimed to align the domestic law to the standards promoted at European Union level, as the text 
relies on the provisions of article 6:111 of the Principles of European Contract Law5, and its 
                                                 
1
 This legal provision read: The obligation arising from a money loan is always for the same value shown in the 
contract. Whenever the value of a currency increases or decreases, before the due date for payment, the debtor 
shall return the exact numeric amount it had borrowed and shall only return such amount in the specie in 
circulation at the time of payment. 
2R.I. Motica, E. Lupan, Teoria generală a obligațiilor civile, Lumina Lex Publishing House, Bucharest, 2008, p. 
76; L. Pop, Tratat de drept civil. Obligațiile.Contractul, volume II, Universul Juridic Publishing House, 
Bucharest, 2009, p. 537. 
3
 R.I. Motica, E. Lupan, op.cit., p. 77. 
4We mention that, based on Article 107 of Law no. 71/2011 for the application of Law no. 287/2009 on the Civil 
Code (published in the Official Gazette no. 409 of 10.06.2011), these provisions only apply to the contracts 
concluded after 1 October 2011, the date of coming into force of the Civil Code. 
5
 Similar provisions are to be found in art. 6.2.1.-6.2.3. of the UNIDROIT principles of international commercial 
contracts. 
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basis is represented by the concept of contractual justice 6 . In essence, imprevision or a 
posteriori prejudice7 covers the prejudice incurred by one of the contracting parties further to a 
significant value imbalance which occurs between the performances of the two parties, in the 
course of contract performance, on account of currency value differences or other 
circumstances, provided that the generating effects do not make the contract unenforceable, 
but make the contract performance excessively onerous for one of the parties8. 
 
2.Adaptation by negotiation - the main objective targeted by the parties 
 In virtue of the principle of contractual freedom, the parties are entitled to “integrate 
the future”9 by way of indexation or adjustment (hardship) clauses10 by which, anticipating the 
unforeseeable event and the relevant costs, the parties agree on the manner of restoring 
contractual equilibrium: by way of indexation, two economic values are correlated in order to 
maintain over time the present value of contractual obligations, this indexation being applied 
automatically, as opposed to the second category of clauses, which involve an active 
involvement of the contracting parties, due to the express commitment to readjust, from time 
to time, the correspondent performances of the parties, given the changes in contractual 
circumstances. However, in such a case, the mechanism of imprevision cannot be applied, the 
parties relying instead on the mentioned clause, in virtue of the principle of the binding force 
of the contract, regulated by article 1270 of the New Civil Code.  
            Therefore, this study aims to identify the options that contracting parties have lacking 
such clauses, namely what measures can be ordered by a court called to revise a convention 
whose equilibrium was broken.  
 Any of the effects generated by contractual imprevision requires certain conditions 
included in paragraph 3 of article 1271 to be met; depending on their level of dependency on 
the activity of the parties, we may discuss a two-fold classification of such conditions11. Thus, 
it is necessary that an exceptional external cause occurs which affects a validly concluded 
synallagmatic contract in progress and which makes the performance excessively onerous and 
obviously unfair for one of the parties (objective conditions); there are two more subjective 
conditions: the debtor should not have expressly assumed the risk of changes in circumstances 
and such assumption cannot be reasonably inferred, namely the debtor should have attempted, 
in a reasonable time and in good faith, to renegotiate the contract. 
  The scope of this institution does not include unilateral legal acts and deeds, but only 
bilateral or unilateral contracts to be performed in time, with the exception of aleatory 
contracts by nature or by the will of the parties. This difference leads to practical implications, 
as in the case of unilateral contracts a party may only request the decrease of its performance 
or a change of the manner of performance, while synallagmatic agreements allow, in addition, 
the possibility to request the court, as provided by law, to order the termination of the  
contract 12 , proposals having also been made to only apply the theory of imprevision to 
commutative contracts and to contracts of successive performance13. 
  In what regards the imbalance prone to initiate a discussion on the concept of 
imprevision, it was shown that it may result either from an excessive disproportion between 
                                                 
6Cristina Elisabeta Zamșa in Fl. A Baias, E. Chelaru, R. Constantinovici, I. Macovei (coordinators), Noul Cod 
civil – comentariu pe articole, C.H.Beck Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 1331. 
7L. Pop, I.-F. Popa, S. I. Vidu, Tratat elementar de drept civil. Obligațiile – conform Noului Cod civil, Universul 
Juridic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 154. 
8O. Lando, H. Beale, Principles of European Contract Law. Parts I and II. Combined and Revised, Kluwer Law 
International Publishing House, The Hague, 2000, p. 325. 
9Y. Picod, Le devoir de loyauté dans l'exécution du contrat, L.G.D.J. Publishing House, Paris, 1989, p. 204. 
10
 R.I. Motica, E. Lupan, op.cit., p. 76; L. Pop, I.-F. Popa, S. I. Vidu, op.cit., p. 155; P. Vasilescu, Drept civil. 
Obligații – în reglementarea Noului Cod civil, Hamagiu Publishing House, Bucharest, 2012, p. 455-456. 
11
 P. Vasilescu, op.cit., p. 457. 
12
 D. Dobrev, Impreviziunea, o cutie a Pandorei în Noul Cod civil?, in Marilena Uliescu (coord.), Noul Cod civil. 
Comentarii, second edition reviewed and supplemented, Universul Juridic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2011, p. 
212.  
13Ibidem, p. 218. 
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the performances of the two parties or from the contract exhausting its usefulness14. Regarding 
the first aspect, we have to mention that the concept does not refer to a mathematical 
imbalance, but takes into account a series of criteria which, in aggregate, allow one to find that 
the items of the object of the contract no longer concur to the performance of the contract. In 
what regards the exhaustion of contract usefulness, this may be inferred from the 
disappearance of cause in the course of contract performance, as the continued existence of the 
cause is of interest in verifying the efficacy of contracts in time.  
  The doctrine issued prior to the entry into force of the New Civil Code claimed that 
imprevision shall determine the revision of the contract and that the relation between the two 
concepts - revision and theory of imprevision - is a whole-part relationship15. In a broad sense, 
contract revision includes imprevision in its content and also aims at other court or legal 
interventions or amicable settlements in the contract performance stage. In a restricted sense, 
revision involves, as the doctrine has emphasised16, a single effect: change of quantity of 
performance. In the opinion of the same author, the concept of revision (lato sensu) survives 
the entry into force of the New Civil Code, having a “peaceful” coexistence with the solution 
of adaptation of the contract mentioned in the contents of article 127117. 
 Prior to the adoption of the New Civil Code, the effects of the theory of imprevision 
have been proposed and analyzed in detail 18 : cessation of the contract by way of 
termination/rescission for cause of imprevision; contract suspension; extension of the contract 
duration; performance by anticipation of the debtor’s obligation; amicable conciliation of the 
parties; stricto sensu revision or direct court intervention with two options: for the purpose of 
setting limits to the revision of performance and for the purpose of exact determination of the 
value of performance; the establishment of an obligation to renegotiate the contract or direct 
court intervention; intervention of the lawmaker by way of regulation, in specific fields, of the 
limits of stricto sensu revision of performance.   
  By analysing the content of article 1271 of the New Civil Code, the current effects of 
imprevision may be deducted: adaptation of the contract by negotiation; contract termination 
by mutual agreement of the parties - both are principal effects, namely they have priority, as 
compared to contract adaptation or contract termination by court intervention - which are 
subsidiary effects of imprevision. At the same time, a party could previously claim a direct 
court intervention by setting an obligation to renegotiate the contract; however, currently, by 
corroborating paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 1271 of the New Civil Code, a conclusion may be 
drawn that the court intervention will always be subsidiary and subsequent to the attempt to 
amicably settle the dispute between the parties by way of negotiation [art. 1271 paragraph (3) 
letter d)]. The introduction of an obligation to negotiate prior to any court intervention is a 
proof of prudence on account of the lawmaker in what regards the amendment of a contract 
which is and needs to remain, first of all, the responsibility of the parties19. 
 Thus, the contracting parties should attempt to restore the contract equilibrium 
amicably20, which also triggers a related obligation21: the party aiming to invoke imprevision 
                                                 
14
 For details, see Anne-Sophie Laverfve Laborderie, La pérennité contractuelle, L.G.D.J. Publishing House, 
Paris, 2005, p. 396-399, L. Thibierge, Le contrat face à l'mprevu, Editura Economica, Paris, 2011, p. 368. 
15
 Cristina Elisabeta Zamșa, Efectele impreviziunii: adaptarea și încetarea contractului, între negociere și litigiu, 
prezent și viitor  in R.R.D.A. issue 7/2009, p. 36. The concept of revision is also included in the French doctrine; 
see Anne-Sophie Laverfve Laborderie, op.cit., p. 103; R. Reviriot, Le droit privé français et la théorie de 
l'imprévision: Essai sur un aspect de l’interprétation de la loi, thesis, G. Mathieu Printing House, Nice, 1951, p. 
93. 
16
 C. Stoyanovitch, De l'intervention du juge dans le contrat en cas de survenance de circonstances imprevues, 
thèse, Marseille, 1941, p. 182 apud Cristina Elisabeta Zamșa, op.cit. (2009), p. 36. 
17
 In supporting this idea, historical and legal arguments have been brought; in detail, see Cristina Elisabeta 
Zamșa, op.cit. (2009), p. 37.  
18
 Cristina Elisabeta Zamșa, Teoria impreviziunii. Studiu de doctrină și jurisprudență, Hamangiu Publishing 
House, Bucharest, 2006, p. 180-230. For a brief overview of comparative law in the matter of imprevision, see E. 
Chelaru, Forța obligatorie a contractului, teoria impreviziunii și competența în materie a instanțelor 
judecătorești, in Dreptul Magazine, issue 9/2003, p. 52-53. 
19
 O. Lando, H. Beale, op.cit., p. 324. 
20
 The adoption of such conduct is also encouraged by the editors of the Draft Code of European Contract Law; 
see, O. Lando, H. Beale, op.cit., p. 324. 
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shall have previously notified the counter party on the difficulties it encounters in the 
performance of the contract, in order to avoid prejudice-generating operations undertaken 
based on a false belief that the contract can be maintained. 
 As noticed in recent doctrine22, the wording of article 1271 of the New Civil Code 
appears to leave the initiation of negotiations to the debtor, however we believe that the 
opinion according to which one cannot exclude the possibility that negotiations are initiated by 
the creditor, should the latter aim to maintain the contractual relation, is grounded23. Analyzing 
the content of article 1271 paragraph (3), the limit of the negotiation obligation becomes 
evident: reasonable and fair adaptation of the contract, in a reasonable time. Due to the 
various and complex situations which may be encountered in practice, no period was fixed for 
the parties to reach an agreement on restoring the contract equilibrium, the text only making 
reference to the concept of reasonableness. The court is left to judge on whether this 
requirement was met, as the court verifies whether the conditions to apply paragraph 2 of 
article 1271, by way of the court intervention in the contract, have been met. 
 A first item to be emphasized in this context is that there is no need to send a notice of 
delay to the debtor24 as this would be against the logic of the imprevision mechanism, which 
does not involve the debtor being notified on its failure to perform, but, instead, the debtor 
playing an essential role, as the debtor usually proposes solutions on the contract’s future 
existence.  
 The Romanian doctrine qualifies the negotiation obligation as a diligence obligation, 
arising from the loyalty and cooperation obligations deducted from the principle of binding 
force of the contract25. Recent French doctrine has brought certain detailed interpretations: on 
the one hand, it involves the achievement of a specific result, in what regards the conduct to be 
adopted by the parties, and the duty of best efforts, in what regards the purpose aimed at in the 
negotiations - to reach a compromise, the parties being held by good faith to make their best 
efforts to save the contract, without necessarily the negotiations resulting in an agreement; on 
the other hand, it was stated that it is preferred to use the concept of duty of negotiation, as any 
obligation involves a debitum and a obligatio, an active and a passive subject, and 
renegotiation cannot be a receivable for one of the parties and a liability for the other party, 
each party being able to be both the creditor and the debtor of the renegotiation obligation, and 
this duty is not subject to the general regime of obligations, as it cannot be assigned or 
enforced26.  
 The underlying principle of the renegotiation obligation - the principle of good faith - 
may be regarded as an ethical instrument allowing the existence of a general obligation to 
renegotiate. In this case, a court intervention could be possible, but only to verify whether a 
party’s refusal to take part in the negotiations is a breach of the good faith obligation which 
could be sanctioned on grounds of contractual liability or not27. 
 The renegotiation obligation is the highest form of contractual solidarity28, but is not 
unlimited, as it ends where the debtor’s obligation begins. The debtor shall be deemed to 
manifest a disloyal conduct and therefore act in bad faith when it asks for the adaptation of the 
contract, being aware that the contract equilibrium has been fully compromised and the only 
option is to terminate the contract29. At the same time, loyal renegotiation does not involve an 
obligation to maintain the contract, but an obligation to prove contract communion, as the 
creditor is liable only to make proposals allowing the alleviation of the imbalance, and cannot 
                                                                                                                                                         
21R. Reviriot, op.cit., p. 117. 
22Cristina Elisabeta Zamșa in Fl. A Baias, E. Chelaru, R. Constantinovici, I. Macovei (coordinators), op. cit., p. 
1331. 
23L. Pop, I.-F. Popa, S. I. Vidu, op.cit., p. 160. This is also mentioned in the commentary to Article 6:111 of the 
Principles of European Contract Law; see O. Lando, H. Beale, op.cit., p. 326. 
24
 Cristina Elisabeta Zamșa, op.cit. (2006), p. 191-193. 
25L. Pop, I.-F. Popa, S. I. Vidu, op.cit., p. 159-160.  
26
 L. Thibierge, op.cit., p. 448-450. 
27
 F. Terré, Ph. Simler, Y. Lequette,  Droit civil. Les obligations, 11th edition, Dalloz Publishing House, Paris, 
2013, p. 522. 
28Y. Picod, op.cit., p. 213. 
29Ibidem, p. 228. 
I. Gânfălean, I. N. Gheberta 
be obliged to sacrifice its own interest; not lastly, the creditor cannot refuse in block all the 
debtor’s proposals in an attempt to maintain the initial contractual situation, as this would 
represent a breach of the renegotiation obligation, in bad faith. Also, a party’s conduct cannot 
be duplicitous or aim at delaying or fraudulent effects. 
 Based on the content of article 1371 of the Preliminary Draft on the Reform of the Law 
of Obligations and of the Law of Limitations (Catala Preliminary Draft) 30 , the French 
Doctrine31 claimed the sanctioning of the party in breach of its obligation to negotiate in good 
faith the contract by payment of punitive damages in an amount to be established based on the 
benefits obtained by the respective party. 
 Therefore, good faith needs to exist for the entire duration of negotiations, in order to 
avoid a result potentially opposite to the desired one, by worsening the debtor’s position 
further to the creditor obtaining additional unjust gains. The foremost purpose of negotiations 
is to restore the parties in a relatively balanced position. In order to achieve this, the parties 
have a wide range of possibilities available, as they may adapt the contract in terms of the 
performance due, by the way of decreasing or increasing their quantity or by rescheduling the 
performance, for example by extending the initial term of performance. 
 The result of negotiations shall be included in an addendum to the initial contract32, and 
it would be impossible to claim that a novation took place, lacking an agreement between the 
parties to the contrary, given the provisions of article 1610 of the New Civil Code: Novation is 
never presumed. The intention to novate should be unquestionable. At the same time, the 
effects resulting from this manner of changing the obligation - settlement of guarantees, loss of 
exceptions or remedies arising from the initial contract - could not have been considered by 
the parties at the time of negotiation of the contract, as the parties aim to salvage the initial 
agreement, all its elements included. In fact, as the doctrine suggestively calls it, a “double 
fungibility” takes place33: the substitute object is fungible for the initial object, and the cause, 
understood as contract purpose, is not changed. 
 Should the parties fail to remedy the imbalance which has occurred, and the contract 
purpose has been completely exhausted, the contract having become “sterile”34, the parties 
may find the contract terminated by contrarius consensus35. 
 3. Limits of court intervention in terms of imprevision 
 The revision of the contract in court, on grounds of imprevision, expresses a change to 
its contents, by court intervention, at the request of one of the parties, in order to reassess the 
mutual performances of the parties whose equilibrium was broken36; it relies on the principle 
of good faith, plus the demonstrative principle of contractual solidarity37.  
The court intervention in contracts was long regarded with reluctance38 both by the doctrine 
and in practice, and the supporters of this possibility have tried to ground their opinion on the 
                                                 
30This article provides that: A person who commits a manifestlydeliberate fault, and notably a fault with a view to 
gain, can be condemned in addition to compensatory damages to pay punitive damages, part of which the court 
may in its discretion allocate to the Public Treasury. A court's decision to order payment of damages of this kind 
must be supported with specific reasons and their amount distinguished from any other damages awarded to the 
victim. Punitive damages must not be the object of insurance. 
31
 L. Thibierge, op.cit., p. 472. 
32
 L. Thibierge, op.cit., p. 464. 
33
 A. Ghozi, La modification de l'obligation par la volonté des parties, thèse, préf. D. Tallon, L.G.D.J., 1980, p. 
33 apud L. Thibierge, op.cit., p. 465. 
34
 L. Thibierge, op.cit., p. 493. 
35
 As it was shown, this wording is to be preferred over mutuus dissensus; see, Ph. Malaurie, L. Aynès, Ph. 
Stoffel-Munck, Drept civil. Obligațiile, Wolters Kluwer Publishing House, Bucharest, 2010, p. 395. 
36
 L. Pop, op.cit., p. 536. 
37Ibidem, p. 540. 
38
 Reluctance in granting the court the power to analyze a contract affected by unforeseeability is surprisingly 
found even in drafts aiming to reform the matter of obligations; thus, article 1135-1 from Catala Preliminary 
Draft  provides that: In contracts whose performance takes place successively or in instalments, the parties may 
undertake  to negotiate a modification of their contractwhere as a result of supervening circumstances, the 
original balance of what the parties must do for each other is so disturbed that the contract loses its point for one 
of them. As it can be observed, the role of the court is limited to the possibility to order the negotiation of the 
contract between the parties and to sanction a failure of such negotiations. 
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rediscovery of an already existing principle – the principle of good-faith performance of the 
contract39, which relied on the content of article 970 of the Civil Code (1864)40. 
 The possibility of adaptation of the contract in court has been expressly provided in 
the current article 1271 paragraph 2 letter a) of the New Civil Code, thus putting an end to past 
discussions according to which it would introduce a factor of legal uncertainty and would give 
way to arbitrary interpretations41.   
 Particular attention shall be paid to assessing the risk which was or was not previously 
taken by the debtor. This situation may be overcome in two ways42: either by the occurrence of 
an event which involves a risk that was not taken, or by the importance attached to the risk 
taken, in virtue of usual foreseeing rules being circumvented by the circumstances of its actual 
manifestation. The extent of the risk the debtor should have rationally assumed can only be 
inferred from the entirety of circumstances existing at the time of conclusion of the contract, 
taking into account the speculative nature of the contract (the higher it is, the more important 
will the risk be presumed to be), the situation of the parties, the potential initial imbalance 
between the performances and each party’s attitude (for example, the performance of 
obligations without reserves, the conclusion of new contracts, the initiation of offers to change 
the agreement, as the debtor is the best “judge” of its own risk)43. As opposed to the adaptation 
by negotiation, whose purpose or content is left to the discretion of the parties, the mentioned 
text introduces expressis verbis the purpose of contract adaptation in court, with reference to 
the criterion of fairness.  
 In addition, other four sub-criteria were proposed44 in order to provide guidance to 
courts in distributing losses and benefits: the criterion of equivalent performance, the criterion 
of mutual performance, the criterion of commutativity, plus the criterion of proportionality, 
which has been long debated by the French doctrine as well45. The correction ordered by the 
court in view of adapting the contract should aim at the “absorption” of the gap between the 
usual profit resulting from the differences in the “risk sphere” to which the parties have 
consented and the undue profit generated by imprevision46. Thus, in order to achieve an 
equitable distribution of benefits and losses, it is necessary that the debtor bears the portion 
which reduces its profit margin to zero, and the creditor bears the portion which exceeds the 
cost of performance47. 
 In the same context, we believe the solutions proposed in the comments to the 
Principles of European Contract Law useful, as they attempted to provide milestones in order 
to avoid slippages in the case law48:  
- - dismissal of the request to revise the contract when the “remedy” proposed would be 
worse than the already existing imbalance; for example when, further to revision, a hardship is 
created for the contracting party which was not initially affected by imprevision; 
- changes to contract clauses should ensure the restoration of the contractual equilibrium 
so that the additional cost generated by the unforeseen circumstances be shared equitably;  
- extension of the performance period, increase or decrease of the price, quantities; 
- if the core objective - to maintain the contract - can no longer be reached, the court 
should take into account such obligations that were already performed when setting the 
contract termination date; 
                                                 
39
 Cristina Elisabeta Zamșa, op.cit. (2009), p. 44. 
40
 The legal text provided: “(1) Agreements must be performed in good faith. (2) They shall bind the parties not 
only to their express provisions, but to all consequences which the respective obligations arise, according to their 
nature, in equity, custom or law". 
41
 For a presentation of the case law discussing contract unforeseeability prior to the adoption of the New Civil 
Code, see E. Chelaru, op.cit., p. 55-57. 
42
 R. Reviriot, op.cit., p. 93. 
43Ibidem, p. 94-95. 
44
 Cristina Elisabeta Zamșa, op.cit. (2006), p. 211-213. 
45
 Laurence Fin-Langer, L'équilibre contractual, L.G.D.J. Publishing House, Paris 2002, p. 367. 
46
 L. Thibierge, op.cit., p. 455. 
47Ibidem, p. 454. 
48
 O. Lando, H. Beale, op.cit., p. 326-327. 
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- the payment of an indemnification for a certain period and finding the contract 
terminated upon the expiry of the agreed deadline; not lastly, the court may order the payment 
of additional amounts49. 
 However, there is a limit imposed on the court, which cannot be ignored: further to the 
approach taken in order to restore the “balance” of contractual performance, the parties cannot 
be obliged to accept a different contract. The “correction” applied to the agreement cannot be 
a novation, as the purpose is not to settle the initially provided obligation and then create a 
new obligation; at the same time, there is no animus novandi, the contractual relationship is 
not broken but, on the contrary, the parties’ will is for it to be maintained50. 
 Whenever the unforeseeable event cannot be qualified as ominous, but as nullifying51, 
there is no option for the court but to order the termination of the contract, at the time and 
under the conditions it establishes [article 1271 paragraph (2) letter b)]. On the other hand, 
termination may be triggered by the parties’ failure to reach an agreement and upon the 
express request of at least one of the parties for the court to order the termination of the 
contract. For this last effect of imprevision to be put into practice, the court needs to pay 
particular attention to the distribution of losses so that, after ordering the termination of the 
agreement, such termination is not fully borne by the party not affected by the change in the 
contractual circumstances, as the other party shall bear the normal risk arising from the 
performance of its obligations. 
 4. Conclusions 
 Long repudiated, always controversial, the theory of imprevision seems to have won in 
doctrine and case law arguments, finding legal consecration in article 1271 of the New Civil 
Code. In this study we were concerned, in particular, about paragraph 2 of this text, making an 
analysis of the effects that the mechanism of imprevision may generate should the conditions 
of its application be met.  
             It is natural that the foremost effect remains the adaptation by negotiation, to the 
extent to which the contract may be salvaged, as it allows safeguarding the connection 
between the effectiveness of an agreement and the requirements imposed by moral or equity. 
By default, court intervention is only an ultima ratio, when the contract equilibrium cannot be 
restored amicably.  
 Due to its novelty, contract imprevision will continue to represent the source for new 
debates, therefore the subject remains open not only in terms of the effects it entails, but also 
in terms of its conditions and scope, and for this purpose the practice will play an 
overwhelming role.   
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